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Abstract
Background:  The regulation of human cloning continues to be a significant national and
international policy issue. Despite years of intense academic and public debate, there is little clarity
as to the philosophical foundations for many of the emerging policy choices. The notion of "human
dignity" is commonly used to justify cloning laws. The basis for this justification is that reproductive
human cloning necessarily infringes notions of human dignity.
Discussion: The author critiques one of the most commonly used ethical justifications for cloning
laws – the idea that reproductive cloning necessarily infringes notions of human dignity. He points
out that there is, in fact, little consensus on point and that the counter arguments are rarely
reflected in formal policy. Rarely do domestic or international instruments provide an operational
definition of human dignity and there is rarely an explanation of how, exactly, dignity is infringed in
the context reproductive cloning.
Summary: It is the author's position that the lack of thoughtful analysis of the role of human
dignity hurts the broader public debate about reproductive cloning, trivializes the value of human
dignity as a normative principle and makes it nearly impossible to critique the actual justifications
behind many of the proposed policies.
Background
Dolly, the most famous sheep in history, was euthanised
on February 14 this year at the age of 6 after being diag-
nosed with an incurable lung disorder. [1] Dolly was a
famous symbol of both the great possibilities of science
and a focal point for public concerns about the social
impact of biotechnology. Almost immediately after
Dolly's birth, there were calls to introduce regulatory con-
trols of the technology. Though most countries still do not
have specific cloning laws [2], it continues to be a signifi-
cant national and international policy issue. But despite
years of intense academic and public debate, there
remains little clarity as to the philosophical foundations
for many of the emerging policy choices.
In this paper, I briefly explore one of the most commonly
used ethical justifications for cloning laws, the idea that
reproductive cloning necessarily infringes notions of
human dignity. As we will see, there is, in fact, little con-
sensus on point. Unfortunately, the counter arguments
are rarely reflected in formal policy. Few, if any, domestic
or international instruments provide an operational defi-
nition of human dignity [3,4]and there is rarely an expla-
nation of how, exactly, dignity is infringed in the context
reproductive cloning.
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Admittedly, I do not provide my own definition of human
dignity. I will, however, endeavor to divine the likely def-
inition of human dignity at play in the context of a given
social concern. We will see that regardless of the definition
that seems to be implied within the social concerns out-
lined below, there are legitimate counter arguments that
weaken the claim that human reproductive cloning neces-
sarily infringes human dignity. Many thoughtful scholars
have already done an admirable job attempting to define
human dignity and it place in the policy making process.
[5–8] The goal of this paper is not to provide a compre-
hensive review of these possible definitions, and there are
many, or to definitively answer the question of whether
human reproductive cloning infringes human dignity.
Rather, in this paper I argue that the lack of thoughtful
policy analysis of the role of human dignity hurts the
broader public debate about reproductive cloning, trivial-
izes the potential value of human dignity as a normative
principle and makes it nearly impossible to critique the
actual justifications behind many of the proposed poli-
cies.
Discussion
Concerns About Human Dignity
Numerous arguments of varying persuasive force have
been put forward as justifications for a ban on reproduc-
tive cloning. To cite just a few examples, some commenta-
tors have suggested that the visceral reaction that many in
the public have had to the idea of human reproductive
cloning is, from a policy perspective, significant enough to
justify, on its own, a regulatory response. [9] Others have
suggested reproductive cloning would have an adverse
impact on the social definition of family: "Modernity's
assault on the family would thus be complete with the
development of cloning. Already stripped of its social
function, the family would now be rendered biologically
unnecessary, if not irrelevant".[10] And, of course, there
are the clear health and safety issues that are far from
being resolved.[11] Indeed, Dolly's death, while not
definitively traceable to the cloning process, again high-
lighted the possible health risks associated with reproduc-
tive cloning. [12]
However, the broadest concern, and the concern that is
often explicitly mentioned in relevant policy statements,
is that human reproductive cloning, at some level,
infringes notions of human dignity. One of the best
known illustrations is UNESCO's Universal Declaration
on the Human Genome and Human Rights which recom-
mends a ban on "practices which are contrary to human
dignity, such as reproductive cloning". [13] Similarly, in
1998, the World Health Organization reaffirmed that
"cloning for the replication of human individuals is ethi-
cally unacceptable and contrary to human dignity and
integrity".[14] The Council of Europe's Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and its Additional Proto-
col on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings states
that: "the instrumentalization of human beings through
the deliberate creation of genetically identical human
beings is contrary to human dignity and thus constitutes a
misuse of biology and medicine".[15]
Despite the existence of such policy statements, and
despite almost universal public objection to the idea of
reproduction cloning [16] there is, at least in the academic
community, little agreement about the role of human dig-
nity in this context. Indeed, it has been suggested that
"aside from the moral debate on whether the embryo is a
human being arguments about human dignity do not
hold up well under rational reflection".[17]
Below I briefly consider some of the reasons commenta-
tors remain skeptical of the claim that reproductive clon-
ing infringes human dignity. The goal is not to provide a
comprehensive analysis of all the relevant critiques, but to
simply highlight a few of the counter arguments and sub-
stantive considerations that remain largely absent from a
consideration of human dignity in the context of formal
policy development.
Autonomy and Uniqueness
At the heart of many of the human dignity arguments,
often implicitly, is the idea that copying someone's
genome is a morally problematic action. From the per-
spective of human dignity, the concern is founded on the
assumption that a clone's autonomy will be compromised
and that a person's genome is singularly important to
human uniqueness.[18] For those who espouse this view,
dignity is obviously closely related to autonomy (likely to
some version of the classic Kantian view of dignity) and
the ability to make autonomous choices. Moreover, dig-
nity is connected to human "uniqueness," though it is
rarely explained why this is so. As Donald Bruce argues:
"Willfully to copy the human genetic identity seems to go
beyond something inherent in human dignity and indi-
viduality". [19] Many policy statements, such as the few
noted above, seem to adopt this view and specifically link
genetic identity with the concept of human dignity. Other
statements simply assert that "the production of identical
human individuals" [20] or the creation of a "genetic
'copy"' [21] should be banned.
The ethos that underlies these positions is, of course, both
scientifically inaccurate and philosophically problematic.
Without resolving the point, let us assume that, somehow,
uniqueness is central to an individual's dignity. We must
ask, then, what role our genome has in our uniqueness
and, more to the point, why copying it infringes human
dignity. Our genome plays a key role in how we develop,
but it is hardly determinative of who we are as individuals.BMC Medical Ethics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/4/3
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Is an identical twin's dignity compromised because of the
mere existence of a sibling with an identical genome?
More importantly, our genes do not, on their own, bind
our future life to a particular course. Absent other external
factors (such as social or parental expectations), an indi-
vidual's autonomy is not compromised solely because he/
she does not have a unique genome. To believe otherwise
is to adopt a deterministic view of the role of genes that is
simply wrong. [22,23] There are very few human traits
that are controlled solely by genetic factors, and this is
particularly true of the infinitely complex characteristics
that make us who we are as individuals. [24] A human
clone would be wholly unique and, as such, it is difficult
to maintain that even a "uniqueness" view of human dig-
nity is dependant on having a unique genome.
From a policy perspective, it is worth noting that a variety
of commentators have long questioned the deterministic
argument that underlies the autonomy/uniqueness con-
cern about reproductive cloning. For example, shortly
after the birth of Dolly Sir John Polkinghorne noted that
" [o]ne of the by-products of the furor about Dolly has
been to remind thoughtful people of the poverty and
implausibility of a genetic reductionist account of human
nature". [25] George Wright takes this idea to an extreme
length by suggesting that reproductive cloning would
actually promote human dignity by proving the inaccu-
racy of genetic determinism. "Human cloning may well
serve to highlight, to emphasize, and to set off with greater
clarity, quite apart from anyone's intentions, the mysteri-
ous capacities that comprise and express our human dig-
nity".[26]
Instrumentalism
For some, it is not the technical copying of a genome that
gives rise to concerns about reproductive cloning, but the
possibility that cloning will be used in a way that instru-
mentalizes the clone. Again, this issue is likely tied to the
concern that reproductive cloning would infringe the
basic Kantian tenet to treat every human being as an end,
not as a means. [27] It is certainly possible that the use of
reproductive cloning for the purpose of creating an indi-
vidual for a particular life role could infringe the resultant
clone's dignity. However, it is the pressure or social expec-
tations (expectations that are necessarily informed by an
inaccurate view of the role of genes) placed on the individ-
ual clone that challenge the clone's human dignity, not
the process of reproductive cloning. As noted by Pattin-
son, the act of cloning could be implicated in an intention
to "violate the rights of the clone in the future." He goes
on to note, however, that in such circumstances, "it is not
the cloning as such that violates the clone's rights, but the
intention to make the clone worse off (relative to its alter-
natives) in the future". [28]
That said, some argue that the mere act of cloning instru-
mentalizes the clone, "because the clone is created for the
primary benefit not of the individual but of some third
party as a means to an end". [29] This argument is prob-
lematic for a number of reasons. First, it raises the interest-
ing question of whether an act done prior to the birth of
an individual can infringe the dignity of that individual.
Even if an individual is created with instrumental inten-
tions, if, after the birth of the individual, he/she is treated
as an equal member of the community, as an autonomous
individual and with respect, is the individual's dignity still
being infringed?
Second, if one accepts that our genes do not determine
our life course or who we are as individuals, it is unclear
how the technical act of cloning is more problematic, in
relation to instrumentalism, than having children
through IVF or, for that matter, making children the natu-
ral way for the sole purpose of producing an heir, labour
or a means of old age support. Of course, one could argue
that, for the sake of consistency, these latter activities
should also be banned. However, monitoring and assess-
ing the motives of perspective parents would not, quite
obviously, be a practical or appropriate state policy.
Finally, these kind of instrumentalist concerns assume
that cloning would always be done for instrumentalist
purposes, which may not be the case (e.g., individuals
may simply wish to use cloning for the same reason peo-
ple use IVF, for the purpose of having biologically related
offspring). As noted by Steven Malby: "From the point of
view of dignity, the desire to treat infertility clearly does
not violate any of the parameters associated with an objec-
tive perspective of dignity". [30] At a minimum, it is hard
to support the argument that all forms of reproductive
cloning will inevitably infringe human dignity. "We
should distinguish among the different forms, uses, and
contexts of human cloning in assessing the relationship
between cloning and human dignity".[31]
Replication
Closely tied to the concerns regarding instrumentalism
and the copying of an individual's genome, are the claims
that the asexual nature of the process is "unnatural," that
cloning is "replication" and not "reproduction" and that,
therefore, by implication, cloning degrades human dig-
nity. Gilbert Meilaender notes that we "find asexual repro-
duction only in the lowest forms of life. ... Children
conceived sexually are 'begotten, not made.' When a man
and a woman beget a child, that child is formed out of
what they are. What we beget is like ourselves, equal to us
in dignity and not at our disposal". [32]
Though individuals may not feel comfortable with the
process (just as many did not feel comfortable with cadav-BMC Medical Ethics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/4/3
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eric research, in vitro fertilization and sperm donation),
there must be something about the "replication" process
that infringes human dignity. It is unclear how, exactly,
the asexual nature of the process, on its own, is problem-
atic from the perspective of human dignity. Again, people
may have nefarious motivations for using cloning – just as
they may have questionable reasons for using IVF or hav-
ing children the natural way – but aside from religious
arguments regarding the moral status of the embryo and
the significance of sexual union, there seems to be little to
support the notion that "replication" infringes human
dignity.
Meilaender's claim that being created by a sexual union
that is beyond "reason or will" is central to our dignity
seems to suggest that the thousands of children born as a
result of reproductive technologies are, somehow, less
worthy of dignity. [33] Surely the process used to produce
an individual is completely irrelevant to the respect and
dignity the individual deserves once born. In fact, if we
lived in a society that allowed individuals created by clon-
ing, or any other process, to be treated as less than human,
reproductive cloning would be far from our most pressing
policy concern.
Community Dignity
It has also been suggested that reproductive cloning may
adversely impact "communal dignity" or "the dignity of
humankind". [34] While a detailed discussion of this
issues is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be
remembered that not all agree that "communities" have
dignity in the same way that individuals have dignity.
Indeed, most traditional legal applications of human dig-
nity emphasize not the community but the protection of
individual rights, often in an effort to guard against state
imposed incursion upon individual autonomy. [35,36] As
summarized by Deirk Ullrich in relation to law in Canada
and Germany: "human dignity is an indispensable com-
pass in our continuing journey to promote and protect the
rights and freedoms of the individual". [37] That said,
there are those who take a more expansive, less Western
centric, view of dignity, suggesting, for instance, that dig-
nity is also relevant to the way in "which groups visualize
and constitute themselves." [38] This type of reference to
"communal dignity" can be found in documents such as
the UNESCO Declaration: "no research or its applications
concerning the human genome, in particular in the fields
of biology, genetics and medicine, should prevail over the
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and
human dignity of individuals or, where applicable, of
groups of people" [39]
However, even if one accepts a community view of human
dignity, we see that in the context of reproductive cloning
much of the concerns remain closely associated with indi-
vidual autonomy. For example, Malby poses the question
thus: "Does dignity impose a responsibility to protect a
key feature of humanity (our 'genetic heritage'), from
which (to an undetermined extent) we acquire key capac-
ities such as autonomy and the capacity for moral
thought?".[40] But if one's genetic make up is not a key
feature to our autonomy and moral thought, and few
could genuinely claim that it is, then a central plank of
this concern is lost.
The Policy Response
Early in the cloning debate, many of the above points
were noted by well-known scholars from a wide range of
philosophical perspectives. [41–43] Nevertheless, there
are few policy making entities that have, at least on the
surface, engaged the human dignity debate in any mean-
ingful manner. [44]
In Canada, for example, the government has recom-
mended a ban on all forms of human cloning. The Health
Canada information document that accompanied the
publication of the proposed law simply claims, without
any explanation of how or why, that human cloning
"would be banned because it treats human beings as
though they were objects and does not respect the individ-
uality of human beings". [45] A later report by the Parlia-
mentary Standing Committee on Health also
recommends a ban on human cloning. The Committee
noted that the recommendation is based on a number of
core principles, including human dignity, but the Com-
mittee makes no attempt to relate the recommendation to
the notion of human dignity. [46]
The two US reports, the 2002 US President's Council on
Bioethics [47] and the 1997 Report of the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission [48], do, at least, discuss
the fallacy of genetic determinism. Nevertheless, they do
not connect this analysis to the issue of human dignity
and both conclude that reproductive cloning still creates
problems in relation to individual autonomy. For exam-
ple, the President's Council concludes that " [w]hat mat-
ters is the cloned individual's perception of the
significance of the 'precedent life' and the way that percep-
tion cramps and limits a sense of self and independence".
[49] Because this concern is based on the psychological
harm associated with deterministic expectations, and not
on the actual impact of cloning technology, they do little
to support the argument that cloning, as a technology,
infringes human dignity. In fact, as I have noted else-
where, cloning laws that are not accompanied by thought-
ful policy analysis may have the unintended effect of
legitimizes perceptions of genetic determinism.[50]BMC Medical Ethics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/4/3
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Why Human Dignity?
If one were to take a skeptical view of the policy making
process, it would not be hard to conclude that concern for
human dignity is used as a justification for cloning laws
precisely because the notion of human dignity is both so
revered and so ill-defined. This fits well with the broad,
generalized concerns that the public seems to have about
reproductive cloning. As noted by Ronald Dworkin, the
public isn't terribly worried about safety or research ethics,
but have "some deeper, less articulate ground for that
revulsion, even if they have not or perhaps cannot fully
articulate that ground, but can express it only in heated
and logically inappropriate language, like [a] bizarre refer-
ence to 'fundamental human rights..."' [51]
This view of public attitudes is supported by survey data.
Risk and safety are not the issues driving public reaction.
When asked, the public often lists morality and/or reli-
gion as the basis for their objection to human cloning.
[52] As such, policy makers can safely use the concept of
human dignity to reflect general unspecified condemna-
tion. For a good percentage of the public, human repro-
ductive cloning simply seems immoral and, for lack of a
better philosophical argument, it is declared that it
infringes human dignity. Dworkin puts it in less secular
terms: "It is wrong, people say, particularly after more
familiar objections have been found wanting, to play
God". [53]
Another reason concerns for human dignity may be used
so frequently as a justification for cloning bans is that they
allow policy makers to avoid more socially controversial
and politically charged rationales, such as those based on
a particular religious perspective or abortion politics. It is
far easier, at least politically, to say that a given law is
based on concern for human dignity than on, for exam-
ple, a Christian view of the moral status of the embryo –
though there seems little doubt that religious perspectives
have played an important role in the policy process. [54]
In addition, the use of human dignity allows policy mak-
ers to avoid the appearance that they are seeking to regu-
late morality. For many legal scholars, moral belief or
repugnance "is not sufficient to outlaw conduct engaged
in by consenting adults". [55]
Finally, I suspect that much of the debate remains scientif-
ically ill-informed. Media images of reproductive cloning,
which are everywhere, often portray clones as "carbon
copies". [56] These representations undoubtedly impact
the public's "intuitive" response to the technology and the
public's desire to ban the technology.
Conclusion
In fact, I too have intuitive concerns regarding the appro-
priateness of human reproductive cloning. I believe that
reproductive cloning will have little practical use, the
health and safety concerns will likely endure for decades,
and it may create some challenging genetic enhancement
issues. There are, no doubt, sound reasons to consider the
tight regulation of reproductive cloning.
Why, then, is the ad hoc use of the notion of human dig-
nity in the context of reproductive cloning a problem? It
hurts public debate. Though I am tremendously skeptical
of the worth of intuitive reactions as a justification for a
given law, particularly criminal prohibitions [57] if gen-
eral cultural anxiety is one of the rationales for a proposed
ban, then this should be explicitly stated. Policy makers
should not dress up the argument as a concern for human
dignity in order to create the perception of legitimacy. By
doing so, transparency in policy making is obscured or
even lost. As noted by Shaun Pattinson in his critique of
the Canadian government's use of human dignity as a jus-
tification for a ban: "Once again we are left with the feel-
ing that other arguments are in play but remain unsure as
to what those arguments are". [58] But without knowing
that these "other arguments" are, it is impossible to have
an informed policy discussion.
If the concerns about cloning are based on the fear that we
live in a world increasingly governed by inaccurate views
of genetic determinism and, therefore, people may have
inappropriate ideas of what cloning can do, [59] then this
too should be stated. Indeed, it could be argued that we
should be focussing our policy making energy not on the
technology but on the possible causes of the deterministic
sentiments that may motivate the desire to use reproduc-
tive cloning. Unfortunately, "genetic determinism" is a
much more challenging and amorphous policy target as
compared with human cloning technology.
In addition, using human dignity as a blanket argument
against all forms of human cloning makes it much more
difficult to reflect rationally on the true risks and benefits
of the technology. Such claims can have powerful rhetor-
ical force (no one is against the idea of human dignity!).
[60] But, as noted by Beyleveld and Brownsword, "from
any perspective that values rational debate about human
genetics, it is an abuse of the concept of human dignity to
operate it as a veto on any practice that is intuitively dis-
liked".[61]
Finally, we are in danger of trivializing and degrading the
potential normative value of human dignity. There seems
little doubt that the rapid advances that are occurring in
the field of science, and biotechnology in particular, will
continue to create new social and regulatory challenges,BMC Medical Ethics 2003, 4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/4/3
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many of which may also raise issues associated with
notions of human dignity. The way we handle current sci-
ence policy issues stands as a precedent for future analysis.
The ad hoc application of human dignity in relation to
human cloning will undoubtedly impact how it is applied
to future technologies. We should strive to apply the prin-
ciple in a logical and coherent fashion otherwise the
notion of human dignity is in danger of being eroded to
the point where it stands as nothing more than a symbol
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